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Experts

by Carl E. Schneider

G

eorge Bernard Shaw famously
said that all professions are conspiracies against the laity. Less
famously, less elegantly, but at least as
accurately, Andrew Abbott argued that
professions are conspiracies against each
other. Professions compete for authority
to do work and for authority over work.
The umpire in these skirmishes and
sieges is the government, for the state
holds the gift of monopoly and the
power to regulate it.
In Abbott's terms, "bioethics" is contesting medicine's power to influence
the way doctors treat patients. If it follows the classic pattern, bioethics will
solicit work and authority by recruiting
government's power. A homely but exemplary recent case suggests one form
that the struggle can take and some
terms it may employ.
The case is Hall v. Anwar. 1 Its story is
sad. When Larry Joseph Hall was born
prematurely, he weighed only 822
grams. He was "blue, flaccid, and limp."
Dr. Anwar tried to resuscitate him.
Nurses recorded "a decreasing heart
rate." Dr. Anwar, however, said at the
subsequent trial that he never heard a
heartbeat, and he gave the boy an
APGAR score of zero, which meant he
believed there was no heartbeat. After
trying to revive the infant for eleven
minutes, Dr. Anwar concluded that he
was dead. The child was "wrapped in a
blanket and placed in a warmer." Fifteen minutes later, however, "a technician noticed that the infant was grimacing and attempting to cry." Dr. Anwar
was summoned and "resumed efforts to
resuscitate the child." The child lived
10

but did not prosper. He "suffers various
conditions including severe brain damage."
The Halls sued Dr. Anwar and the
hospital for malpractice. They claimed
that Dr. Anwar and the nurses performed negligently when they first tried
to revive Larry and that they should
have persisted for more than eleven
minutes.
As in many malpractice cases, the
trial in Hall considered whether the alleged malpractice had actually caused
the patient's disabilities (whether, that
is, anything Dr. Anwar and the hospital
did worsened Larry's medical problems
or whether, instead, "internal conditions during the pregnancy caused all of
the infant's injuries"). But the case's interest for us arises out of the Halls' argument that Dr. Anwar performed below
the "medical standard of care." Various
doctors testified that he did not. Dr.
Anwar's lawyer also presented a videotape of
deposition testimony of Father
John Paris, a Catholic priest and
professor of bioethics .... This deposition had been taken during discovery by the Halls' attorney without any cross-examination by the
defendants. Father Paris is an expert
in the area of medical ethics. He
has spent significant time in hospitals and engaged in professional activities in conjunction with medical
professionals.
The priest-ethicist "attempted to provide an expert opinion that Dr. Anwar's
actions concerning all aspects of the re-

suscitation were 'appropriate' and 'within the standard of care."'
The jury found that Dr. Anwar was
not liable, and the Halls appealed. The
Halls contended that the trial judge
should not have let the jury see the ethicist's deposition. The appellate court
agreed.
The appellate opinion is in many
ways quite a typical product of a common law court. The opinion confronts a
question courts have not fully explored:
to what extent can bioethicists testify as
experts in medical malpractice trials?
But the opinion refuses to evaluate that
question as an abstract issue or even to
decide it as a matter of principle.
Rather, the court asks whether the specific testimony of the specific witness in
the specific case should have been admitted. The theory of common law adjudication ratifies this reticence. That
theory expects that-if the issue is important-it will recur in other cases in
various forms. Each new instantiation
will present somewhat different facts,
and each court will ask whether the specific evidence should be admitted in
light of the gathering precedent and the
new circumstances. After this process of
garnering examples and testing principles has proceeded for a while, courts
can begin to draw broad rules from the
developing pattern of holdings about
the admissibility of ethicists' testimony.
The process is incremental, cautious,
concrete, pragmatic, and (however feebly) empirical. It can also be opaque,
unreflective, and erratic, particularly in
its early stages.
The Hall court began with black-letter law. Malpractice is a failure to meet a
profession's minimum standards. Professions handle abstruse and technical
problems laymen do not understand.
They thus must set their own standards.
As one typical formulation puts it, doctors must "exercise that degree of care,
skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent" doctor in the same specialty. The jury must be told what medicine's standards are, but only by people
who understand them-by professionals, and even professionals in the same
specialty. The Hall court cited a case
that held that "a pulmonary specialist
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[is] not qualified to opine on [the] standard of care of [an] emergency room
physician."
The court then applied the general
rule to the specific case: "Father Paris
was not qualified to render opinions
about a medical standard of care." The
court did not suggest that the priest was
not some kind of expert. But he was the
wrong kind: "If Father Paris had testified solely as to whether it was moral or
ethical to resuscitate or terminate resuscitation of the infant, then his testimony would have been irrelevant to the
legal issue of malpractice." The "legal
issue of malpractice" is whether professional standards are violated, and who
knows better than members of the profession?
The court saw one of the problems
with this argument: "We recognize that
some medical standards of care are influenced by medical ethics. A decision
concerning the termination of resuscitation efforts is probably an example of an
area in which the standard of care includes an ethical component." The
court saw the problem, but its answer
was perhaps rather conclusory: "The
standard of care . . . still involves the
level of care owed by a similar health
care provider and not that owed by an
ethicist." Again, malpractice is a breach
of professional standards; professionals
know those standards best.
Implicitly invoking common law
theory, the Hall court warned that "the
testimony of a medical ethicist might be
appropriate in some circumstance." The
court suggestively cited two cases. In
one, the plaintiff alleged that she told
her doctor her relations with her ex-husband were "extremely strained" but that
the doctor called the ex-husband to ask
about her use of pain medications
(which led him to sue for custody of the
couple's children). In the other case, the
plaintiff said her chiropractor had become her psychotherapist and had "sexually assaulted" her in violation of a law
making it a crime for "an individual
who purports to provide professional
medical or counseling services to engage
in a sexual act with a client or patient."
Closer examination reveals that neither case seems to presage any considerJuly-August 200 I

able role for bioethicists in testifYing
about what the medical standard of care
should be. Neither case seems to raise
questions about what medical goals are
proper or about what medical means are
effective. The issue in both cases was essentially whether the behavior complained of was unethical. But that behavior violated such elementary ethical
principles that an ethicist might be
called simply to report on what standards the medical profession had actually adopted, rather than to opine on
what was ethically desirable. Indeed, the
behavior was so flagrant that one might
wonder whether any kind of expert testimony is needed to establish its impropriety.
This leads us to another objection to
the Hall court's "professions set professional standards" principle-that professions may indulge themselves in lax
standards. How might future courts respond to this objection? Courts are not
naive enough to believe that professions
always set optimal standards. Judges
know Shaw's aphorism. Bur they seem
to have concluded that they are poorly
situated to rewrite medicine's standards.
The most conspicuous effort to do so-a case about when ophthalmologists
should test patients for glaucoma-was
subsequently attacked on medical
grounds and speedily reversed by the
legislature. Courts seem, then, to believe that the best is the enemy of the
good and that any governmental supervention of medical standards should
come from other agencies of the state.
Even if courts were more confident
of their own capacity to revise medicine's standards, they might still doubt
bioethicists' ability to do so. A scent of
this motive perhaps wafts from the
opinion in Hall. The appellate court
ruled that the trial court should have excluded the ethicist's testimony. But the
court refused to order a new trial because that error was "harmless." Among
other things, the
testimony was often very abstract,
describing such things as the "metaphysical" and "epistemological" issues associated with the "postKantian world" and its view that

"perception is the real." It is not
surprising that all of the lawyers essentially ignored this testimony
during closing arguments.
Expert testimony is ordinarily admitted
only where it rests on some kind of "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge" which can "assist the trier
of fact." The Supreme Court has invoked the dictionary definition of
"knowledge"-a "body of known facts
or any body of ideas inferred from such
facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds." Science is the modal case,
and scientific validity is tested by asking
questions like whether a theory is "derived by the scientific method," whether
it can be and has been empirically tested, and whether it is widely accepted.
Did the Hall court doubt that ethicists
produce "knowledge" of the sort that
leads courts to admit expert testimony?
Did the Hall court doubt that testimony so "abstract" could assist any likely
trier of fact?
We have been considering Hall v.
Anwar as an example of interprofessional competition between medicine and
bioethics. But does it also reflect such a
competition between law and both
those disciplines? The priest-ethicist's
presumed expertise was to say what is
right and wrong. Such normative decisions, however, are precisely the work of
judges and juries. What, the Hall judges
may have asked themselves, gives the
ethicist a deeper insight into right and
wrong than we have? A more legitimate
insight? The court twice strongly implied that, had the ethicist's testimony
rested on his religious beliefs, it would
have been self-evidently inadmissible.
But did the court think that any other
basis for his testimony would have endowed it with any more legitimacy than
the conclusions of the trial court as the
interpreter of the law's precedent or of
the jury as the interpreter of the community's standards?
1. 774 So2d 41 (Ct App Fla 2000).
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